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
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MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 5, May 1985



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5 September 1985

USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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REAR SUPPORT: ECONOMICS OF VICTORY IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 26 Apr 85) pp 22-27

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences, Prof, Col S. A. Bartenev: "The Economic Victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War was a severe testing of the viability of the Soviet social and state system, its economic and social order. The Soviet state withstood this severest testing with honor. In the clash against the most powerful forces of imperialism, the inexhaustible inner possibilities, the great strength and invincibility of the progressive social order arising out of the Great October Socialist Revolution were convincingly demonstrated. The bases for the economic victory of the Soviet Union were established long before the start of the war. In preparing the nation to repel aggression, the Communist Party was guided by Lenin's instructions that only decisive economic transformations could increase the nation's defense capability and that in a modern war the economic organization is of crucial significance. As was emphasized by V. I. Lenin, for war against the imperialist aggressors "we must prepare seriously and over a long time, commencing with an economic upsurge of the nation."¹ These Leninist ideas and demands have underlain the economic course unswervingly carried out by the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

The socioeconomic changes carried out in the course of industrializing the nation and collectivizing agriculture during the years of the prewar five-year plans were of enormous significance for strengthening the material bases of defense. The establishing of socialism in all spheres of the economy and in the areas of social life multiplied the material and organizational prerequisites for defense and helped to strengthen the technical and economic independence of the nation. By the end of the 1930's, the Soviet Union possessed a powerful and highly developed industry capable of producing modern machine tools and machines, means of transport and first-rate instruments, diverse chemical products and highly productive equipment. Gross industrial product in 1940 exceeded the 1913 level by 7.7-fold. Some 31.1 million tons of oil and 165.9 million tons of coal were mined, 48.3 billion kilowatt hours of electric power were generated and 18.3 million tons of steel were cast.² A predominant portion of the industrial product was produced at new or fully reconstructed enterprises.

In the situation of the commenced World War II, in the nation important measures were carried out to broaden the mobilization abilities of industry so that

it was capable in a short period of time of switching to the production of defense products. The production capacity of the tank, aviation and ammunition plants was expanded. Defense production during these years developed at a more rapid pace than industry as a whole. Thus, while in the Second Five-Year Plan, all industrial product increased by 2.2-fold, for defense product the figure was 3.9-fold.³ The state reserves and mobilization supplies of the most important strategic materials and food were increased. In the 18 months preceding the start of the Great Patriotic War, the state material reserves almost doubled.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government devoted particular attention to increasing the output of armored, aviation and artillery equipment. Thus, the Chelyabinsk and Stalingrad tractor plants as well as the Sormovskiy ship building plant were converted to tank production. A number of enterprises were involved in producing tank engines, hulls and turrets. Extensive work was done to build and reconstruct the aviation plants. The machine building enterprises of the other national economic sectors were switched to the production of aviation products. The physical plant of the scientific research institutes, design bureaus and testing ranges was broadened. New types of tanks and combat aircraft were quickly designed and put into series production.

In spite of the fact that it was impossible to achieve all that had been planned to strengthen national defense, the main thing was achieved and the Soviet Union possessed a powerful material-technical base and had carried out immediate organizational measures which strengthened the economic and defense potential. This improved the nation's readiness to repel aggression.

The Soviet Union had to wage the military-economic clash under extremely disadvantageous conditions. In preparing to attack the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany drew widely on the economic base of the enslaved and dependent states. In the occupied countries it seized industrial and agricultural raw materials, various equipment, means of transport and widely used forced labor of foreign workers. During this period Nazi Germany possessed military-economic resources which surpassed the resources of the USSR by approximately 1.5-2-fold. Thus, before the attack on the Soviet Union, Germany surpassed it by 2.5-fold in terms of the size of the machine tool fleet, and by almost 1.5-fold in terms of the number of workers employed in machine building. In 1940, Germany mined 2.54 more coal than the USSR, it cast much more aluminum and magnesium and produced more electric power, steel, cement, locomotives and trucks. The capacity of the railroads running to the Soviet-German frontier from Germany was approximately double the capacity of the railroads running from the USSR.⁴ An advantage of Nazi Germany was also that it had completely shifted its economy to defense production.

The fact must also be considered that the Soviet Union lost a number of economically important regions during the first months of the war. The nation's production capabilities were significantly reduced. Suffice it to say that the enemy-seized territory prior to the war had produced one-third of the industrial product and the basic grain growing areas were located here. The nation was deprived of valuable equipment and materials essential for weapons production.

The attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union required the adopting of extraordinary measures to convert the national economy from a peacetime to wartime

standing. First of all, it was essential to fundamentally alter the entire sectorial structure of the national economy in the aims of increasing military production, maximally expanding the then existing defense production and initiate extensive capital construction. The reorganization encompassed virtually all spheres and sectors of the national economy. Everything was aimed at more fully meeting the needs of the Armed Forces and in the shortest time to achieve military and technical superiority over the enemy.

The planned management of the socialist economy made it possible for the Soviet state to concentrate men and equipment on carrying out the main, most urgent and immediate tasks. This was also aided by the reorganization of the activities of the state and economic bodies and by the change in the forms and methods of production management.

Due to the labor heroism of the working class, the evacuated enterprises in an exceptionally short period of time had resumed production. Here are several examples. The last train with equipment from the Kharkov Tractor Plant arrived at the new site on 19 October and by 8 December the first 25 T-34 tanks assembled from shipped-in units had been dispatched to the front. The plant buildings for the evacuated enterprises were put up at times directly in the steppe, in severe frosts and in hurricane-force winds. They were rebuilt within times unprecedented in the history of world industry.

In shifting the national economy to a wartime footing, an important role was played by the change in the structure of national income and the centralized redistribution of the nation's financial resources. While in 1940, 15 percent of national income was spent on military needs, in 1942, the figure was 55 percent.⁵ The total volume of state budget resources employed for military purposes in 1941-1945 was 582.4 billion rubles.⁶

Substantial changes also occurred in the structure and organization of defense production and in the management and planning system. The increased output of defense products was ensured also by a corresponding reorganization of industry and transport and increased output in the sectors cooperating with the defense enterprises. Thus, the machine building plants curtailed the output of civilian products and broadened the production of weapons and military equipment. Motor-cycle production was switched to producing firearms, tractor production to tank manufacturing while timepiece production was shifted to the output of fuzes for shells and mines.

The temporary loss of economically very important regions and industrial centers during the first months of the war had a deleterious effect on the operation of industry and transport and all the economic sectors. The end of 1941 and the start of 1942 were the most difficult period for the Soviet economy. The drop in industrial production was halted only in December 1941 and by mid-1942 this had not only been recovered but the capacity of the defense industry which had been lost during the first months of the war had been surpassed. In a short period of time, the Soviet Union under most difficult conditions was able to switch the national economy to a wartime footing and create a smoothly operating military economy which in ever-increasing amounts produced the defense products. All of this was proof of the enormous mobilization capabilities of the socialist economy, its viability and efficiency.

Regardless of the wartime losses and destruction (66 percent of the industrial production enterprises were destroyed or shut down), in a majority of the base heavy industry sectors in a short period of time there was an increase in the production of the products needed for the defense industry, for transport and the national economy as a whole. The leading defense enterprises operated around-the-clock and this ensured stricter and more precise planning of the output of both finished products as well as parts, stock and semifatures.

Ferrous metallurgy developed the production of high-alloy steels and high-quality rolled products. The main suppliers of the steel and rolled products needed for producing military equipment and ammunition were the Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk combines as well as the old Urals plants. In comparison with 1940, ferrous metallurgy in 1945 produced twice the amount of section structural steel, 3.5-fold more structural sheet and more than 2-fold more pipe stock. The miners of the Kuzbass, Karaganda and the other coal basins supplied metallurgy with the coking coal. Coal output in the eastern regions of the nation rose from 7.9 million tons (1940) to 18.4 million tons (1945).⁷ All of this served as a sound base for producing military equipment and weapons.

An enormous amount of work was carried out during the war years by the 2-million-strong army of construction workers. Construction organizations assembled and installed the evacuated equipment and erected new plants and power plants, mines and pipelines, blast and open-hearth furnaces, armor-rolling mills and railroads. For example, the second stage of the Urals Aluminum Plant was built and put into operation in a short period of time, an aluminum plant was built in Novokuznetsk, a pipe-rolling plant in Chelyabinsk and new machine building enterprises in Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk, in the central regions of the nation and on the territories of the Northern Caucasus, Ukraine and Belorussia which were liberated from the occupiers.

Agriculture operated under difficult conditions, particularly during the first years of the war. Some 47 percent of the planted area was located on enemy-occupied territory. Labor resources had declined, there was not enough agricultural machinery and labor productivity dropped. The expansion of the planted area was a major condition for increasing the grain harvests and producing other agricultural products. From the second half of 1943, agriculture was quickly resumed in the liberated regions. In 1944, the nation harvested 48.8 million tons of cereals and this was 19.2 million tons more than in 1943.⁸ The number of livestock increased and the production of the basic livestock products rose. Regardless of all the difficulties, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes during the war years supplied the army and the population with food and industry with raw materials.

The transport system of the Soviet state also withstood the wartime test. During the war years the nature and direction of the freight flows changed. The load factor for the railroad network increased. Troop shipments comprised around 30 percent of all rail shipments. Reconstruction work, gauge changing and the rebuilding of destroyed bridges and viaducts and equipment.

Over the entire war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, there was a stubborn and unceasing struggle to achieve quantitative and qualitative superiority in military equipment and most fully meet the needs of the Armed Forces. In

possessing less capability and working under immeasurably more difficult conditions, the Soviet economy in a stubborn and continuing economic duel was able to achieve a decisive about-face in its favor. At the end of 1942, the ratio for the basic types of military equipment between the operational armies of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany changed in favor of the Soviet Army and from that time continued to increase constantly.

The economic clash of the USSR with Nazi Germany was carried out over the entire war under conditions where Germany produced more basic types of industrial product than the USSR. Regardless of this, the Soviet Union was able to significantly surpass Nazi Germany in the production of the main types of weapons and military equipment. In terms of the amounts of the average annual output of field artillery pieces, the Soviet Union surpassed the average annual German production by more than 2-fold, by 5-fold for mortars, by 2.6-fold for antitank guns but was somewhat behind Germany in terms of the output of antiaircraft weapons. At the time that Soviet industry in 1942-1944 produced over 2,000 tanks a month, German industry reached its maximum of 1,450 tanks only in May 1944.⁹

Thus, while behind Nazi Germany in the production of a number of major types of industrial products, the Soviet Union was able with maximum results to utilize every tone of metal and fuel, every unit of machine tool equipment. Calculated for every 1,000 tons of steel cast, Soviet industry produced 5-fold more tanks and artillery pieces than did German industry and for every 1,000 produced metal-cutting machines, 8-fold more aircraft.¹⁰ This was achieved due to the planned organization of production, the greatest possible centralization of resources, the rigid economy of materials and the labor feat of our glorious working class.

The efficiency of socialist production can also be seen from the drop in expenditures for the output of a unit of defense product. While at the start of the war the increase in military production was achieved primarily by the redistribution of resources and an increase in the number of workers employed in producing armaments, subsequently predominantly internal resources became the basic source for the increase in production. From mid-1942, the increase in military production and the greater output of heavy industry products were achieved by higher labor productivity and reduced material expenditures.

Thus, for the production of an Il-4 aircraft, labor expenditures dropped from 20,000 man-hours (1941) to 12,500 man-hours (1943); for a PE-2 aircraft, respectively, from 25,300 man-hours to 13,200 man-hours. At the artillery plants labor expenditures on a 76-mm field cannon dropped from 1,200 man-hours to 800 man-hours, on a divisional gun from 2,200 man-hours to 600 man-hours. Labor expenditures at the tank plants for producing the T-34 tank dropped from 8,000 man-hours to 3,700 man-hours while labor expenditures on the KV tank declined from 14,600 man-hours to 7,200 man-hours.¹¹

The eastern regions of the nation, such as the Urals, Volga and Western Siberia, began to play a crucial role in the production of defense products. In terms of the output of defense products, the Urals held first place among the economic regions of the nation. It produced up to 40 percent of all the defense industry products. Here were produced 60 percent of the medium tanks and 100 percent of the heavy tanks. One out of every two shells was made from Urals steel.

The Soviet military economy possessed the necessary manpower reserves and broad capabilities for maneuvering these. The problem of providing industry with skilled personnel under wartime conditions was unusually complex. In 1942, the number of manual and white collar workers in the national economy had dropped to 18.4 million persons in comparison with 31.2 million persons in 1940. Then it gradually increased, reaching 23.6 million persons in 1944 and 27.3 million persons in 1945. An exceptionally important role was played by the increased proportional amount of female labor: from 38.4 percent in 1940 to 57.4 percent in 1944.¹²

The Lenin slogan "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory!" was crucial in the work of the rear workers. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, they carried out an unprecedented labor feat, providing the front with weapons and ammunition, food and clothing. The Soviet Armed Forces over the war years received more than 10 million tons of ammunition, more than 16 million tons of fuel, 40 million tons of food and fodder and 12-15 million tons of other supplies.¹³ Thus, the victory won by the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany and its allies was not only political and military but also economic. It clearly demonstrated the futility of the plans of the international reaction to count on the supposed "weakness" of the socialist economy. The Soviet economy was mobile and capable of quickly readapting and responding more effectively to a change in the situation, to use more efficiently the internal reserves and more fully satisfy the needs of the Armed Forces. The Soviet Union was able to successfully carry out the main task in the economic conflict, to achieve superiority in the production of the means of armed combat. The Soviet economy during the course of the war in rate and scale surpassed the output of defense products by an extremely strong enemy and provided the Armed Forces with the necessary amount of military equipment and weapons which were the equal or superior in their tactical-technical specifications to the Wehrmacht weapons, thereby providing the material basis for the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

¹ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 395.

² "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Kratkaya istoriya" [World War II. A Concise History], Moscow, Nauka, 1984, p 120.

³ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 12, 1982, p 154.

⁴ Ibid., p 157.

⁵ "Istoriya sotsialisticheskoy ekonomiki SSSR" [The History of the USSR Socialist Economy], Moscow, Nauka, Vol 5, 1978, p 486.

⁶ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 12, p 147.

⁷ "Stal dlya pobedy" [Steel for Victory], Moscow, Mysl, 1983, p 221.

- ⁸ "Sovetskaya ekonomika v period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [The Soviet Economy During the Period of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Nauka, 1970, p 260.
- ⁹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 12, p 168.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., p 170.
- ¹¹ N. A. Voznesenskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 552.
- ¹² "Sovetskaya ekonomika v period...", pp 191, 193, 194.
- ¹³ "Ty1 Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1977, pp 5, 492.

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RESPONSIBILITIES OF WARTIME HIGH COMMAND AGENCIES DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 26 Apr 85) pp 28-40

[Article by Army Gen A. M. Mayorov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces: "Strategic Leadership in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] One of the factors which brought about the world historical victory of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War was the skillfully organized and effectively implemented strategic leadership.

Because of the growing threat of aggression from the Nazi bloc during the pre-war period and considering the experience of the Soviet-Finnish War, the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the Soviet government carried out significant changes in the military leadership bodies and introduced adjustments in the functions of the directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense [NKO]. The range of tasks comprising the competence of the General Staff and the Main Naval Staff was made more specific.

At the same time, the work of establishing a system of strategic leadership had not been fully completed by the start of the war. Not all the questions related to the organization of the Soviet Army High Command and its working bodies had been actually resolved. Under the conditions of the rapidly developing events and the unfavorable strategic situation at the outset of the war, this, naturally, could not help but be reflected on the course of carrying out the set tasks. Moreover, the enormous spatial scope of the armed conflict, the intensity and dynamicness of operations which developed during the first hours of the war and the use of large masses of troops and diverse combat equipment placed new demands on the strategic leadership. All of this necessitated the establishing of a structure of strategic leadership bodies and the employing of forms and methods of command and control for the troops and naval forces which would conform best to the nature of the commenced war.

In the interests of achieving victory it was essential first of all to have the complete mobilization of all material, spiritual and specifically military capabilities of the state. Considering this, the leadership of the nation and the Armed Forces, as in peacetime, was headed by the CPSU Central Committee. Under its leadership, a reorganization was carried out in all the economic and sociopolitical life of the nation in accord with the war's needs; enormous work was done to mobilize all the progressive forces of the world to fight against Naziism.

One of the important elements in the military organizational work carried out by the party and its Central Committee was the establishing of the superior bodies of state and military leadership for the period of the war.

On 30 June 1941, by a joint decision of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of People's Commissars [SNK], the State Defense Committee (GKO) was established with all power in the state being concentrated in its hands and bringing together political, economic and military leadership. As the superior governmental body, the GKO carried out the following functions: directed the activities of all the state institutions, the party, Komsomol and trade union organizations; it carried out the tasks of mobilizing the nation's human resources for the needs of the front and the national economy, the preparation of strategic reserves and personnel for the Armed Forces and industry; it established the volume, nature and date for the delivery of military products to the Army and Navy; it organized the struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy rear. In accord with the political aims of the war, the GKO set the strategic missions for the Supreme High Command, it made available to it the necessary men and equipment and directed and supervised the practical activities of Headquarters. The joint session of the Politburo, the GKO and Headquarters discussed the major measures to prepare and carry out military campaigns and strategic operations.

On the second day of the war, 23 June 1941, by a decree of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the Soviet government, Headquarters of the High Command was organized and subsequently this was renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and later Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC], the superior body for strategic leadership over the military operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Its main functions were: complete and continuous assessment of the strategic situation as well as the prospects of its development; determining the forms and methods of strategic operations; working out overall concepts and adopting decisions to conduct campaigns and strategic operations; setting missions for the fronts and the Armed Services.

An important area in the activities of Headquarters was the actual organizing of the carrying out of adopted decisions. This was manifested in ensuring an advantageous balance of forces on the basic sectors, in organizing and maintaining cooperation between the strategic groupings, Armed Services and fronts, and in selecting and placing the leading military personnel. In the course of the campaigns and strategic operations, Headquarters kept close track of the development of military operations, it promptly adjusted or set new missions stemming from the developing situation, in the necessary instances it carried out the regrouping of men and weapons, it reassigned fronts for operations on new sectors and strengthened them with its reserves. Headquarters showed constant concern for further improving the effective strength and organizational bases of the Armed Forces, for the ongoing development of military equipment and for a creative search for new methods of conducting armed combat considering the changed conditions and the arising military-political and strategic tasks.

In preparing for a new campaign, Headquarters, without disclosing its essence, acquainted the leaders of the fronts with their missions deriving from the overall concept of forthcoming operations. The commanders of the fronts, in

accord with the instructions received, worked out and then submitted their own proposals on the plans for the forthcoming operations to the General Staff. The proposal from the fronts were carefully studied, coordinated and adjusted and after this, Headquarters issued directives on conducting the operations. On the basis of these the fronts worked out the plans for the operations and these were then examined in detail by the Supreme High Command and after adjustments, if they were needed, were approved. Such a procedure for the work of Headquarters ensured the evidencing of initiative by the military councils of the fronts.¹

At various times the membership of Hq SHC included prominent political, state and military leaders such as: K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. K. Timoshenko, V. M. Molotov, G. K. Zhukov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, S. M. Budennyi, N. A. Bulganin, A. M. Vasilevskiy, A. I. Antonov and N. G. Kuznetsov. Over the entire war, I. V. Stalin headed Hq SHC and he combined the positions of general secretary of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the chairman of the USSR SNK, the chairman of the GKO and supreme commander-in-chief.

In providing strategic leadership over the Armed Forces, Hq SHC relied on its own operational working body, the General Staff. During the entire war, it skillfully resolved a broad range of problems, it was constantly up on all the events occurring over the enormous Soviet-German Front and responded instantly to each change in the situation. In the work of the General Staff, an important place was held by the collection, study and analysis of data on the operational-strategic situation on the fronts. As a rule, the chief of the General Staff or his deputy reported two or three times a day to the supreme commander-in-chief on the position of the troops and the nature of their actions. In addition to reports, a map was prepared on which all changes were plotted which had occurred in the situation at the given moment.² A thorough analysis of the situation made it possible to correctly foresee the course of coming events and predict the possible development of armed combat.

The General Staff was a truly creative laboratory. It carried out all the required operational-strategic calculations and elaborated recommendations and proposals for Headquarters on the conduct of the campaigns and strategic operations. Suffice it to say that starting from 1942, Headquarters did not take a single decision on any important question without first hearing the opinion of the General Staff. On the basis of its instructions and the proposals from the fronts, the General Staff planned the campaigns and strategic operations in detail as well as the operational-strategic use of the Armed Services and branches of troops. The operational functions of the General Staff also included the elaboration of the organizational structure of the Armed Services, the coordinating of actions of the fronts and the partisans, the organizing and supervising of the execution of a strategic maneuver and the course of the operational-strategic movements, the organizing of strategic reconnaissance and other types of operational support as well as ensuring uninterrupted contact with the fronts and armies.

The General Staff was the main organizer for actually implementing the overall concepts and plans of Headquarters. It provided the required aid to the staffs of the fronts and armies in planning the front and army operations and exercised control over the preparation of the troops for the forthcoming operations

and the accurate carrying out of the directives and orders of the Supreme High Command, over the replenishing of the troop formations and operational field forces, over their logistical support and the consumption of equipment by the fronts in the operations.

The General Staff coordinated the activities of the commanders of the Armed Services, the branches of troops and their staffs, the chiefs of the main and central directorates of the NKO for the most rational utilization of the men and equipment in the planned campaigns and strategic operations. It maintained close contact with the USSR Gosplan and the people's commissariats concerned with supporting the combat activities of the Armed Forces. Together with them as well as the chief of the Soviet Army Rear, the General Staff worked out and submitted to the government requests for defense products in accord with the strategic plans outlined by Headquarters. One of the crucial tasks of the General Staff was to prepare proposals, reports and materials on all military questions to be discussed at governmental meetings and international conferences for the states of the anti-Hitler coalition as well as on establishing and employing foreign formations fighting along with the Soviet Armed Forces.

During the war years, the General Staff was successively headed by such experienced military leaders as Army Gen G. K. Zhukov, MSU B. M. Shaposhnikov, MSU A. M. Vasilevskiy and Army Gen A. I. Antonov.

In providing operational-strategic leadership, a significant role was also played by the commanders of the branches of troops and their staffs. On the basis of the instructions from Headquarters, they organized the field forces of their branch of troops, they ensured their training and provided help to the fronts in their combat employment.

For providing leadership over the work of the rear services of the Armed Forces in 1941, the position of the chief of the Soviet Army Rear Services was established with the organizing of a staff under him. The chief of the Rear Services was directly under Headquarters and had full responsibility for the logistical support of the operational army.

Political work was directed by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and the Main Political Directorate of the Navy. These directed party political work in the Army and Navy to carry out the decrees of the party Central Committee and the GKO and the orders of Hq SHC and the USSR people's commissar of defense.

Important functions in the leadership of armed combat were carried out by the corps of General Staff officers the representatives of which were permanently assigned to the staffs of the fronts, armies and individual tank and mechanized corps. With their aid the General Staff not only obtained the necessary information on the state of affairs in the troops but also checked the fulfillment of the directives, orders and instructions of the Supreme High Command.

Due to the fact that the fleets and the naval flotillas at the outset of the war in operational terms were under the commanders of the fronts, for joint operations on the maritime sectors, the direct leadership, upon instructions from Headquarters, of independent naval operations in the naval theaters, the

development of the fleets (flotillas) and their logistical support became the main tasks of the People's Commissariat of the Navy and the Main Naval Staff. From the spring of 1944, when the fleets were put fully under the people's commissar of the Navy who simultaneously was the commander-in-chief of the Naval Forces, it and the Main Naval Staff began to carry out a large portion of the tasks related to the planning and leadership of naval combat operations.

Thus, even during the first months of the war, a rather ordered system developed of strategic leadership bodies and these, proceeding from the military-political goals, carried out a complex range of tasks to control the troops and naval forces. As experience was to show, this system withstood the severe testing and demonstrated its viability.

The armed conflict on the Soviet-German Front was waged under various situational conditions. This necessitated the employment of diverse forms of strategic leadership. At the outset of the war, when the combat operations, in developing along an enormous front from the Barents to the Black Seas, proved extremely unfavorable for us, when the situation changed very quickly and contact between the fronts and Headquarters was not sufficiently dependable, the GKO in the aim of bringing strategic leadership closer to the troops, took a decision to introduce an additional command element between the fronts and Headquarters in the form of the main commands of the strategic sectors. Main commands were organized for the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern Sectors and in the spring of 1942 for the Northern Caucasus Sector. These were entrusted with the tasks of providing operational-strategic leadership over the fronts and fleets fighting on the given strategic sector, providing control over the fulfillment of the Headquarters directives and directing the work of the operational rear. This was a new form for the control and command of the Armed Forces arising out of the needs of practice and the particular features of the developing situation. It must be said that it played a definite positive role. Within the context of a certain strategic concept, unity was achieved in the operations of the men and equipment. Cooperation between the fronts and the naval forces began to be organized more clearly. However, under the conditions of an insufficient material and technical base for command at the outset of the war, it was impossible to provide a sharp improvement in the leadership over the frontline field forces. Moreover, the main commands of the sectors did not possess the required reserves and material resources and because of this they could not actively influence the course of military operations. Under these conditions Headquarters was forced frequently to assume command of the fronts. As the strategic front was stabilized and communications between Headquarters and the fronts improved, the main commands of the sectors and their staffs were successively abolished.³

The positive experience of the work done by the main commands of the strategic sectors was employed in organizing the defeat of the Kwantung Army. The Main Command of the Soviet troops in the Far East was set up for directing the group of Armed Forces in the war against Japan.

The difficulty of directing the activities of a large number of fronts deployed along an enormous expanse and a significant distance away from Headquarters, particularly in organizing and conducting simultaneously several strategic operations, forced the Supreme High Command to seek out new forms of control and command. Under these conditions they began to widely practice the sending

of representatives from Hq SHC to a front. These were sent out to the most crucial sectors where they intended to conduct major strategic operations. The essence and nature of their work were determined by those missions which Headquarters had set for the commands and the troops of the fronts as well as by those specific tasks which they received from the Supreme High Command. The Headquarters representatives, in a majority of instances members of it, had great powers, they provided aid to the command of the fronts and the fleet in preparing the operations in accord with the strategic concept and the plan, on the spot they organized cooperation among the men and equipment, they helped to quickly resolve problems requiring the competence of the Supreme High Command and the NKO, they also supervised the carrying out of the orders and directives from Headquarters and coordinated the actions of the fronts and naval forces.

From the summer of 1944, when the front of armed combat had moved far to the west, in the aim of increasing efficiency in command, in individual instances, the Headquarters representatives were entrusted with direct leadership over the operations of the groups of fronts. As wartime practice was to show, the system of leadership over the strategic operations through the Headquarters representatives at a certain stage made it possible to bring strategic leadership closer to the troops and increase the effectiveness of their command and control.

During the war MSU B. M. Shaposhnikov, MSU K. Ye. Voroshilov, MSU S. K. Timoshenko, MSU G. K. Zhukov, MSU A. M. Vasilevskiy, MSU S. M. Budenny, Mar Art N. N. Voronov and other military leaders were sent to the fronts as Headquarters representatives.

In 1945, the length of the Soviet-German Front had been reduced by 2-fold and the number of fronts had dropped, while their command and staff now had rich experience in troop command and control. Under these conditions, leadership over the combat operations of the fronts and fleets began to be provided directly by the Supreme High Command.

As the command bodies gained combat experience, as their structure was improved and the material-technical base bettered, the methods of strategic leadership also continued to improve. Even in the course of the first operations of 1941, it became clear that under the conditions of broad maneuvering actions, frequent and rapid changes in the situation and the possible temporary loss of contact between the front-level elements and their subordinate staffs, centralization of troop command and control by the Supreme High Command was essential. This was necessitated by the need for clearer coordination of actions between the fronts and naval forces fighting over an enormous expanse and the powerful means of strategic and operational effect available to the Supreme High Command such as the all-arms field forces and formations of the Headquarters Reserve, long-range aviation, airborne troops and partisan formations in the enemy rear. In September 1941, direct contact was established between the General Staff and the staffs of the armies fighting on the Soviet-German Front. The presence of such contact made it possible for the Supreme High Command, by personal talks with the army commanders, when the need for this arose, to be up on the situation in the combat area of their troops, to understand their needs and provide them with the necessary aid. Rigid centralization in strategic leadership by Hq SHC did not deprive the front commanders of an opportunity to show initiative both in preparing the operation and in the conduct of it.

Over the entire war a reasonable combination of collectivism and one-man command underlay the work of the Supreme High Command. All the fundamental tasks of increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces, the most important strategic plans and the main measures to support the front were discussed at the party Central Committee. The plan for military operations in 1944, for example, was reviewed at a joint session of the Politburo, the GKO, Hq SHC and the General Staff leadership. At times commanders of the branches of troops were involved in discussing various questions and in discussing the questions of material support for combat operations, the leaders of the people's commissariats. One should also note such a method of leadership as personal contact of the supreme commander-in-chief with the commanders of the fronts and armies by phone or by summoning them to Headquarters.

One-man command in the leadership of the Armed Forces was expressed in the fact that in all instances the right to take strategic decisions remained with the supreme commander-in-chief. He approved the plans and general concepts for the campaigns and strategic operations and signed the directives for the fronts.

Flexibility of troop leadership was inherent to the activities of Headquarters. Thus, after the surrounding of the large grouping of the Nazi Wehrmacht in the Stalingrad area, Headquarters focused the troops on quickly destroying it and sent the required men and weapons here. But, due to the sharp exacerbation of the situation on the external perimeter, Headquarters shifted its reserves and a portion of the resources to the external perimeter initially to repel the counterstrikes and then for going over to a decisive offensive. Only after this did it issue a directive to begin eliminating the enemy in the Stalingrad area.

The centralization of strategic leadership, the skillful combination of collectivism and one-man command and flexibility in troop command and control largely aided the successful carrying out of the most important missions in the war by the Armed Forces.

The victorious termination of the war against the strong enemy, the Nazi bloc headed by Hitler Germany, demonstrated the high level of leadership by the Soviet Supreme High Command, the operational-strategic maturity of the Soviet military leaders and chiefs and the combat skill of all the Army and Navy personnel. The war convincingly confirmed the advantages of the Soviet system of leadership for armed combat based upon the progressive social system, the high moral qualities and combat skills of the personnel as well as the scientific methods of approaching the solution to arising problems.

The activities of the Soviet strategic leadership, particularly in the last years of the war, were marked by scientifically sound forecasting. Experience has shown that the greater the foresight in taking a decision and the more fully it meets the developing situation, the better the purposefulness and realism of the planning and the better the conditions created for achieving success in carrying out the set tasks.

The decisions taken were based not only on the interests of ensuring the rapid defeat of certain enemy groupings but also envisaged the achieving of specific political and economic goals, such as: liberating important economic regions,

knocking the allies of Nazi Germany out of the war and providing aid to the peoples fighting for liberation from the Nazi yoke.

In the course of the war, Supreme High Command skillfully carried out Lenin's instructions that *"hegemony in a war belongs to the side which fights more energetically and which uses any opportunity to attack the enemy...."* (emphasis ours.--Editors.).⁴ In organizing strategic defense in the first period of the war, Headquarters endeavored to give it an active nature. This was expressed in the fact that Headquarters repeatedly indicated to the fronts and armies that they must conduct counterstrikes, for example, at Luga, Staraya Russa, Smolensk, Yelnya and elsewhere. Due to the great activeness of the defenses, even in the second half of July 1941, the Soviet troops succeeded in stopping the advance of the enemy attack groupings on the Luga defensive line at Leningrad, on the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper Rivers, and to tie down the enemy troops in heavy battles on the Kiev Sector.

The activeness of the strategic defensive was also expressed in the conduct of front offensive operations on a number of sectors following Headquarters orders. Thus, during the period of the defense operations at Moscow, troops from the Southern Front conducted a counteroffensive at Rostov. During the defensive at Stalingrad, troops from the Kalinin and Western Fronts carried out the Rzhev-Sychev Offensive Operation. As a total in the course of the strategic defensive of 1941-1942, over 30 front offensive operations were conducted.⁵

From 1943, when the situation on the Soviet-German Front changed sharply in our favor, the Nazi Command was forced to go over to a strategic defensive in the aim of halting the Soviet Army, wearing down its forces and achieving an end to the war favorable to it. But due to the active offensive strategy of the Supreme High Command, the enemy's plans were not to come about.

The practice of strategic leadership in the war years was enriched by the skillful employment of various forms and methods of strategic actions.

In the Battle of Moscow, when the Nazi Command, having moved up its reserves, undertook a general offensive, Soviet strategic leadership in the course of active combat was able to cause high losses to the enemy assault groupings and then with the forces of three fronts go over to a counteroffensive which then developed into a general offensive. As a result, the enemy troops were thrown back 100-350 km to the west.⁶

At Stalingrad, after the Soviet troops had dealt a defeat to the enemy in a stubborn defensive, Headquarters under the conditions of an actual equality of the sides, skillfully organized and brilliantly implemented an encirclement operation, in the course of which the enemy grouping some 330,000-strong was defeated.

In 1944, in drawing on the achieved results, the Soviet Supreme High Command with great skill carried out a strategic offensive by launching powerful successive attacks along the front and in depth on various strategic sectors. These attacks in the most effective sequence moved along the more than 4,000-km front and this ensured the firm holding of strategic initiative and deprived the Nazi Command of the possibility of effectively using its reserves.

The concluding campaign of 1945 in Europe, with the good balance of forces for us, was conceived and implemented by Headquarters as a simultaneous offensive on all the strategic sectors of the Soviet-German Front. This made it possible for the Soviet Army to break through the enemy strategic front to a great depth, to split and destroy large enemy troop groupings and develop the offensive at a rapid pace.

In the course of the war the Supreme High Command successfully employed such an effective form of conducting combat operations as a strategic operation by groups of fronts. In the final period, in conducting the strategic operations, these involved from 100 to 200 divisions, 20,000-40,000 guns and mortars, from 3,000 to 6,000 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] and from 2,000 to 7,500 aircraft.⁷ The operations were carried out on the major strategic sectors and were characterized by a decisiveness of aims, by great spatial scope, by dynamicness of combat and by the achieving of major military-political and strategic results. Some of them developed on a front of 800-1,000 km and extended to a depth of 500-600 km and in the Manchurian Operation, to 800 km. Here from 50 to 90 enemy divisions were defeated.⁸

The Supreme High Command showed great art in planning the military campaigns and strategic operations as well as in the operational-strategic employment of the Armed Services in them. The war showed the viability of those plans which were worked out on a scientific basis. Of particular importance was realisticness in determining the goals of the strategic operations and in posing tasks on the basis of an objective consideration of the economic, moral and military capabilities of the nation. Under these conditions strategic planning was a creative process and demanded the manifesting of talent by its participants.

It is important to point out that the plans worked out for conducting the campaigns and strategic operations were rather flexible. They almost never remained unchanged and, as a rule, were adjusted prior to the start of military operations and particularly in the course of them, if the situation demanded.

The Soviet Supreme High Command gained great experience in organizing and maintaining strategic cooperation. Depending upon the specific conditions for the conduct of armed combat, various methods of strategic cooperation were employed, including: coordinating efforts by the strategic troop groupings fighting on separate axes and carrying out independent missions; coordinating the actions of groups of fronts and Armed Services advancing simultaneously on a broad front and on all the strategic sectors; coordinating the efforts of the Soviet and Allied troops and so forth. Great attention was given to organizing cooperation between the troops of the fronts and the partisans. Headquarters established the bases of strategic cooperation even in working out the overall concept of the operation, in taking the decision and in setting missions for the fronts.

The coordinating of efforts with the armies of the People's Democracies fighting on the Soviet-German Front was carried out in accord with an agreement reached with the governments of the states providing these forces. The troops from the sovereign states allied with us--Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria--carried out their combat missions while operationally under the commanders of the fronts and armies.

The coordinating of efforts between the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition was creatively solved, under conditions where the armed struggle of the Soviet Army and the Anglo-American troops was carried out on remote and separate theaters of military operations. Overall coordination for the military efforts of these countries and the coordinating of their strategic plans were achieved by systematic correspondence by the heads of the Allied powers on the military-political and strategic problems and goals, by the periodic holding of conferences and by missions of leading military representatives for mutual exchange of information. The exchange of military missions was widely practiced. After the Allied landing in France and the opening of the second front in Europe, the coordinating of efforts with the Allied Command assumed an even more concrete and regular nature. In particular, daily information was provided on the situation on the front and targets were coordinated and allocated for bombing both by Soviet and Allied aviation.

The art of the strategic leadership of the Soviet Supreme High Command was clearly apparent in the skillful establishment and effective employment of the strategic reserves. These were one of the chief means by which the Supreme High Command influenced the course and outcome of strategic operations. In the strategic reserves of Headquarters were fronts, all-arms, tank and air armies, separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, artillery corps and breakthrough divisions as well as formations of other branches of troops. During the last years of the war, field forces and formations of the mobil troops and aviation comprised a significant proportional amount in the reserves. The availability of major reserves for the Supreme High Command and their correct employment made it possible to achieve a fundamental change in the situation, to maintain superiority in men and weapons over the enemy on the main sectors, to constantly increase the force of the attacks and ensure the development of an offensive to a great depth and at a rapid pace. In preparing a campaign or strategic operation, the Supreme High Command, in a number of instances, maneuvered the strategic reserves broadly.

One must also note the skillful determination by Headquarters of the place and time for committing the strategic reserves to an engagement. As a rule, these were employed where the fate of a campaign or strategic operation was determined and they were introduced only when conditions had been created for achieving a decisive change in the situation. Convincing proof of this was the prompt and skillfully organized committing of strategic reserves to battle at Moscow, Stalingrad and the Kursk Salient. During the concluding period of the war, the employment of strategic reserves was envisaged by Headquarters in a general form even in preparing the campaign, considering the possible development of military operations during it.

Headquarters devoted great attention in the leadership of armed combat to achieving surprise in the campaigns and strategic operations. It carried out a number of measures aimed at misleading the enemy on the actual plans. These included: maintaining its intentions a secret, careful surprise and deception, concealed concentration of the forces, disinformation of the enemy, maintaining troop activities in areas where an offensive was not planned, the carrying out of false regroupings and the employment of combat methods which were unexpected for the enemy.

Strategic leadership over the Armed Forces in the course of the Great Patriotic War was continuously improved. It was enriched by a whole series of new ideas and was raised to a higher level. The Soviet Supreme High Command learned from the experience of the war, it drew correct conclusions from this and had a creative approach to resolving the major problems of military art. The course of the war and the outcome of the major engagements and the brilliant victories won by our Armed Forces are indisputable proof of the superiority of Soviet strategic leadership over the strategic leadership of the Nazi Army. Soviet strategic leadership was higher than the Nazi primarily in terms of the depth of analysis and determining the development prospects of armed combat. In the course of the war it correctly determined the strong and weak points of the Nazi German military machine, it boldly employed new effective methods of organizing and conducting strategic operations and was able to mobilize the efforts of the nation and the Armed Forces to repel aggression and fully defeat the enemy and ensure the most rational employment of all the resources at its disposal.

In its practical activities Hq SHC employed those methods of leadership which corresponded most to the specific conditions for conducting armed combat and to the combat situation existing on the front and which ensured the successful carrying out of the missions confronting the Armed Forces.

The rich experience of the Great Patriotic War is of lasting significance. The course of it showed to an even greater degree the tendency toward a merging of political and military leadership and a profound interpenetration and close relationship between policy and strategy. The concentrating of the leadership over the country and the Armed Forces in the hands of a higher military-political body, the GKO, was one of the crucial conditions for the victorious conduct of the war. Only an organic linking of leadership over the nation and the Armed Forces could ensure the most effective use of the economy and the scientific and technical achievements, the full mobilization of the material and moral-political forces of the state as well as the correct employment of the Army and Navy in the interests of achieving victory.

In the course of the war there was a clear delimitation of functions between the various elements of the strategic leadership bodies. Due to the fact that an acute need arose to concentrate the efforts of the General Staff on resolving operational problems, a number of functions carried out by it in peacetime relating to the organizing and training of reserves, the leadership of interior districts and solving a number of other questions of an organizational nature was turned over to other bodies of the NKO.

The experience of the war convincingly showed that for successfully waging war it is not enough to have leading bodies and a dependable communications system. In addition, it is essential to have permanent means for influencing the course and outcome of the campaigns and strategic operations and reasonably dispose of those means and forces which are assigned by the state for the needs of the front.

The course and outcome of the initial period of the past war disclosed an urgent need for establishing the appropriate bodies and a scientifically sound system of strategic leadership even in peacetime and the maintaining of them in a state which would ensure firm and continuous command and control over the troops and

naval forces with the start of military operations without substantial changes in the shift from peacetime to wartime. A positive solution to this problem at present is dictated by the fact that preparations for a surprise attack employing all the newest means of armed combat is the main area of military preparations by the imperialist states and primarily the aggressive NATO bloc.

The experience of the main commands of the strategic sectors on the Soviet-German Front, and particularly the commander-in-chief and his staff in the Far East, clearly demonstrated the advisability under certain conditions of establishing intermediate, very important strategic leadership elements on the most important sectors.

The practice of the war fully confirmed the correctness of Lenin's instructions that "any management work requires special properties."⁹ For exercising strategic leadership over the Armed Forces, the supreme commander-in-chief, his closest assistants as well as the command on the operational-strategic and operational levels had to show extensive knowledge in the area of military affairs, great creative and organizational capacity, high volitional qualities and the ability to mobilize the available opportunities in the interests of achieving victory. The war demanded from the leadership bodies of the Armed Forces the ability not only to consider the situation but also change it in their favor, to predict scientifically the possible development of armed combat over a significant time interval to come as well as take profoundly sound decisions and constantly carry them out.

Objective analysis makes it possible to conclude that success in the leadership of the armed forces during the initial operations of the war depended more and more upon to what degree the theory and practice of troop command as elaborated before the war corresponded to the nature of armed combat and to what degree the established system of strategic command and control corresponded to contemporary conditions.

The experience gained during the years of the Great Patriotic War in strategic leadership of the Armed Forces has largely maintained its importance under present-day conditions. Its profound study and determining the trends for further development considering the occurring changes in military affairs are a major task for the theory of Soviet military art.

The high technical readiness of the weaponry available to the NATO Command and the possibility of using them in extremely limited times demands not only correct but quick strategic decisions and an immediate response to the occurring changes in the situation. This necessitates an improvement in the strategic leadership bodies, the communications system and the command posts, the maintaining of these in constant readiness to carry out the assigned missions, the employing of effective equipment and a greater art of command and control.

Due to the fact that modern wars are waged by coalitions of states, the problem of organizing a dependable system for the control and command of the coalition armed forces has assumed ever-greater significance in strategic leadership. Here of particularly important significance are such problems as ensuring coordinated work of the joint command, achieving a unity in planning the operations of the international groupings of armed forces and organizing strategic cooperation between the allied armies as well as within the coalition groupings.

There can be no doubt that a future war undoubtedly cannot help but lead to the appearance of fundamentally new forms and methods of strategic leadership over the Armed Forces. A thorough scientific elaboration of these is one of the most important tasks for Soviet military theory.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1970, p 54 (the memoirs of MSU G. K. Zhukov).
- ² Ibid.
- ³ The Main Command of the Northwest Sector was broken up on 5 September 1941, the Western on 5 May 1942, the Southwestern on 23 June 1942 and the Northern Caucasus on 19 May 1942.
- ⁴ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 9, p 186.
- ⁵ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1970, p 28.
- ⁶ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 1, 1976, p 496.
- ⁷ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 12, 1982, p 284.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 40, p 215.

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MAJ GEN ANDRIANOV ON PARTISAN MOVEMENT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 26 Apr 85) pp 58-65

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen V. N. Andrianov: "The Struggle of All the Soviet People on the Temporarily Enemy-Occupied Territory"]

[Text] The unstinting, heroic struggle of the Soviet people on the temporarily enemy-occupied Soviet territory is one of the vivid pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. This was a truly patriotic movement of millions brought to life by the just, liberating nature of the war the flames of which were to determine the fate of the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants. The forms and methods for conducting the struggle in the enemy rear were of a varying nature. These included operations by armed partisan formations and underground organizations as well as the mass participation of Soviet people in thwarting the political, economic and military measures of the Nazi Command. The Communist Party was the inspirer and organizer of this struggle.

The active operations of the Soviet patriots in the rear of the Nazi troops commenced literally from the first days of the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. These became an inseparable part of the overall struggle of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces against the Nazi aggressor. In raising the Soviet people to a holy war against the Nazi invaders, the Communist Party and the Soviet government believed that the Soviet people who temporarily fell under the heel of the Nazi occupiers would not accept the lot of slaves prepared for them by the Nazi "New Order."

The party directed the efforts of the Soviet patriots in the enemy rear at a merciless extermination of the Nazi invaders and at providing the greatest possible aid to the Soviet Army. The directive of 29 June 1941 of the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee called upon the party organizations to provide the greatest possible aid to the population of the occupied areas in developing a struggle of all the people in the enemy rear. On 18 July 1941, the VKP(b) Central Committee adopted a special decree "On Organizing the Struggle in the Rear of the German Troops" and this supplemented and concretized the directive of 29 June.

In remembering the instructions of V. I. Lenin about the necessity of conducting partisan combat actions under party control,¹ the VKP(b) from the very first

days of the war introduced consciousness and organization into the partisan movement and underground. The leadership of the partisan struggle was provided on a centralized basis in all elements from the tactical to the operational-strategic. This ensured the effective employment of the partisan forces in the struggle against a strong, technically equipped enemy and the organization of closer cooperation between the partisans and the Soviet Army troops.

The VKP(b) Central Committee obliged the central committees of the communist parties of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Karelo-Finnish SSR as well as the oblast and rayon party committees of these republics and the RSFSR to head the people's struggle in the enemy rear. They recommended involving first of all those persons with experience in the partisan struggle gained during the years of the Civil War as well as the Old Bolsheviks and the party and Komsomol workers.

On the enemy-seized territory, even in 1941, active work was initiated by the underground obkoms, okrug committees, gorkoms, raykoms and other underground party bodies and a large number of primary party organizations and groups. By the end of the first year of the war, around 65,500 communists were operating in the enemy rear and they headed the organization of the people's struggle there.² Under their direct leadership there was a process of the establishing and then the strengthening of the partisan forces and the underground. The enormous scope of the work carried out by the party organizations in the frontline republics and oblasts to set up a party underground and partisan formations largely predetermined the successful development of the people's struggle in the enemy rear.

On the basis of the instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee, overall leadership over the partisan struggle was provided by Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command]. For improving day-to-day leadership over the actions of the partisan forces, by the GKO [State Defense Committee] Decree of 30 May 1942, under Hq SHC a special military-combat body was established, the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement (TsShPD). P. K. Ponomarenko, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party (Bolshevik) was appointed its chief. Simultaneously with the TsShPD, under the military councils of the fronts, front partisan movement staffs were organized, and somewhat later republic and oblast staffs. These were headed by the secretaries for members from the central committees of the Union republic communist parties and the secretaries of the party obkoms and kraykoms.


At the end of August and the beginning of September 1942, upon instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the TsShPD held several conferences for the commanders and commissars of a number of the partisan formations as well as leaders from the party bodies of Belorussia, the Ukraine, Orel and Smolensk Oblasts. Having generalized the experience of the partisan struggle, the VKP(b) Central Committee outlined the basic areas for partisan activities in accord with the strategic plans of the Supreme High Command. The missions of the Soviet patriots fighting in the enemy rear and the ways for further developing the partisan movement were then reflected in the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense I. V. Stalin of 5 September 1942 "On the Missions of the Partisan Movement."

The organizational and political work of the party and the high patriotism of the Soviet people brought about a rapid growth of the partisan forces. A particularly broad influx of Soviet patriots into the partisan detachments commenced in the spring of 1942. In 18 months (from mid-1942 until the end of 1943), the total size of the partisan formations communicating with the staffs of the partisan movement, regardless of the high losses in battle, rose 250,000 persons. After the liberation of the Orel area, the Left Bank Ukraine and the eastern regions of Belorussia, a significant number of the partisan detachments was disbanded and their personnel joined the ranks of the Soviet Army. By the summer of 1944, around 1,100 partisan detachments and groups numbering over 180,000 persons were operating in the enemy rear. Almost 150,000 of them were fighting on Belorussian and Lithuanian territory, more than 12,600 in the western oblasts of the Ukraine and over 10,000 in Estonia, Latvia and the western regions of Kalinin Oblast. Around 1,600 persons were included in the partisan detachments operating in Karelia and Murmansk Oblast and over 1,200 persons in Moldavia.³ The base areas for the main partisan formations as well as the structure for command for the partisan forces as this existed in September 1943 are shown in the diagram.

The increased scale of the people's struggle in the enemy rear and the greater number of partisan formations required a large amount of experienced leaders, demolition specialists, scouts and radio operators. For training them the central committees of the republic communist parties and the party obkoms as well as the military councils of the fronts (armies) organized courses and training points. The partisan cadres in the Soviet rear were also trained in three central schools. Moreover, thousands of independent leaders and organizers of the partisan movement and the underground struggle emerged from the people. Among them were persons from the most diverse professions including party, soviet, Komsomol, trade union and economic workers, commanders and political workers from the Soviet Army, engineers, physicians, agronomists, teachers, workers and kolkhoz members.

Many Soviet patriots were in the partisan reserve formations. The personnel of these formations was located in villages and hamlets of areas under partisan control. In the spring of 1943, the partisan reserve formations just in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Leningrad, Smolensk, Kalinin and Orel Oblasts numbered over 500,000 persons.⁴ Actually all the Soviet persons who endeavored to fight the enemy were the partisan reserve.

As a result of powerful attacks by the partisans, extensive areas in the enemy rear were liberated of the Nazi invaders and here partisan areas and zones were established. In them the population lived according to Soviet laws. Here the party raykoms, the rayispolkoms and rural soviets operated legally, schools, hospitals and clubs functioned, communications worked and the sowing and harvesting of the crops were carried out in an organized manner. The most significant in terms of size and length of existence were the partisan areas and zones in Belorussia, Leningrad, Orel, Smolensk and Kalinin Oblasts and in the northwestern regions of the Ukraine. By the autumn of 1943, over 200,000 mi² of territories seized by Nazi Germany were under partisan control in the enemy rear.⁵



Structure of Command for the Partisan Forces in September 1943

- Key:
- 1--Soviet Army front
 - 2--Actively operating partisan formation
 - 3--Base areas of major partisan forces and territories controlled by them
 - 4--Republic ShPD [partisan movement staff]
 - 5--Oblast ShPD
 - 6--Agencies (operations groups) of republic and oblast ShPD on front
- a--TsShPD with republic and oblast ShPD
- b--Republic and oblast ShPD with agencies (operations groups)
- c--ShPD and their agencies (operations groups) on fronts with partisan formations

The partisan areas and zones deprived the enemy of freedom of action and tied down the maneuvering of enemy operational reserves. The Soviet Army units skillfully utilized the partisan areas for coming out in the enemy flanks and rear.

In viewing combat operations as the most active form for the fight of the Soviet patriots against the Nazi invaders, the Communist Party in every possible way developed this and directed the combat activities of the partisans and the underground at providing the most essential aid to the Soviet Army. Enemy lines of communications, particularly railroads, were the main object of combat activities for the partisans and underground. Starting with sporadic attacks on the enemy lines of communications during the first days of the war, partisan combat operations on the railroads of the enemy lines of communications quickly broadened, they became evermore organized, purposeful and effective and soon outgrew their tactical limits, assuming an operational-strategic significance.

Following a single plan the partisans conducted a series of major operations in the aim of disrupting the operation of the enemy rail lines. These operations were closely timed to the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces. Tens of thousands of partisans participated simultaneously in them. Thus, up to 100,000 Lenin-grad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel and Belorussian partisans and tens of thousands of Soviet persons who were not members of the partisan formations were involved in the "Rail War" Operation conducted according to a plan of the TsShPD in August and the first half of September 1943. By 15 September, they had blown up 214,705 rails.⁶ Just the Belorussian partisans during this period blew up over 120,000 rails, they carried out 836 attacks on enemy trains and destroyed 184 railroad bridges.⁷

In the second half of September there began an operation under the code name "Concert" which, along with the partisan forces which participated in Operation "Rail War" involved many detachments of Karelia, Latvia, Luthuania, Estonia and the Crimea (a total of over 120,000 partisans). According to the admission of the Nazi Command as a result of Operations "Rail War" and "Concert," railroad capacity was reduced by 35-40 percent.⁸ Massed strikes against enemy lines of communications in the interests of the fronts were also launched in the offensive operations of 1944.

The combat operations by the partisans on the enemy lines of communications not only caused the enemy great material harm and reduced railroad capacity but also forced the Nazi Command to divert significant forces to guard the lines of communications. Thus, from the summer of 1942, the fight against the Soviet partisan movement was entrusted to the general staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces (previously this mission had been carried out by special punitive bodies). The Nazi Command had to send regular divisions to fight the partisans. Some 15-16 divisions constantly guarded the lines of communications while 7-8 divisions were used for these purposes periodically. Moreover, reconnaissance and bomber aviation took an active part in the operations against the partisans.⁹

Reconnaissance activities in the interests of the Soviet Army also held an important place in the combat activities of the partisans and underground. Close contact with the local population and the underground organizations made it possible for the partisans to keep extensive territories in the enemy rear under

constant observation and promptly inform the Soviet Command of all the enemy measures. Actually not a single step of the occupiers remained outside the view of the Soviet patriots.

The partisans collected and transmitted to the front and army command the last data on the enemy defensive system and on enemy reserves, they captured crossings and bridgeheads on the banks of major rivers and held them until the approach of the forward units of the Soviet Army and they aided the advancing troops in putting up crossings and bridges, helping to increase the rate of advance of the troops.

In assessing the role of the Ukrainian partisans in the defeat of the occupiers on the Right Bank Ukraine, the commander of the First Ukrainian Front, Gen N. F. Vatutin, has written: "The Soviet soldiers in their operations felt and do feel the immediate aid of the partisan formations which have launched numerous strong attacks against the Nazis from the rear and have cooperated beautifully with our troops in the battles to destroy major defensive centers, to capture cities and defeat the Germans on their fortified lines.... This is above all vivid proof of the combat might of the partisans and their ability, independently and together with the Red Army units, to carry out major, complicated and large-scale military operations."¹⁰

The combat activities of the partisans with each passing year not only assumed greater purposefulness and organization but also became evermore effective. For example, in 1943, in comparison with 1942, the Ukrainian partisans carried out 15-fold more attacks on trains (3,666 and 233, respectively) and 8-fold more routs of enemy garrisons.¹¹ The Leningrad partisans in 1942, derailed 295 enemy trains and in 1943, 466.¹² The Belorussian partisans in the first half of 1942 each month attacked an average of 20 enemy trains and in the second half of the year some 150; in the first half of 1943, the figure was 294 and in the second half 744.¹³

Along with the partisan movement, underground activities assumed great scope in the enemy rear. In contrast to the partisans, the underground operated in small groups or individually under conditions of strict conspiracy. In fighting against the occupiers, they employed their own specific forms and methods of action. Following assignments from the underground party bodies, the underground members penetrated the enemy administrative and economic apparatus, they collected and delivered intelligence information, they wrecked enterprises, they spoiled equipment and conducted work to demoralize the so-called "volunteer" formations. Like the partisans, they conducted great work to explain to the population the true essence of the policy of the occupiers and thwarted the plans of the Nazi leadership which had endeavored to turn the occupied Soviet territories into a base for feeding the army and a source of material resources, primarily oil, grain, lumber and coal.

The most mass form of the fight in the enemy rear was the participation of Soviet citizens in thwarting the economic, political and military plans and measures of the occupiers. The underground party bodies and the command of the partisan detachments channeled the latent, spontaneous dissatisfaction of the population into organized resistance. Thus, the workers and intelligentsia in every possible way rejected mobilization to work at industrial and transport

facilities. The same Soviet citizens who were forced to work at plants, mines and factories did everything possible to reduce the capacity of the operating enterprises as much as possible as well as labor productivity. They delayed product output, they did everything possible to worsen its quality, they intentionally produced defective products, they damaged machine tools, equipment and raw materials, they replaced good parts in equipment with bad, they delayed repairs, refused to show up for work and by every possible means and method thwarted the fulfillment of the assignments by the Nazi administration.

The workers of the Donbass showed an example of great patriotism as the Nazi invaders had placed particular hopes on exploiting the resources of this area. The underground party organizations of the Donbass advanced the slogan "not a single ton of coal, not a kilogram of metal for the occupiers!" Regardless of all their efforts, the Nazis were unable to operate the metallurgical plants here. Nor did they receive Donets coal. The occupiers were forced to ship in coal to the Donbass from the Dombrovskiy Basin. Many plants of Bryansk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kaunas, Krivoy Rog, Minsk, Odessa, Orel, Riga, Smolensk and other enemy captured Soviet cities and industrial areas also did not operate with them [Donets coal].

The occupiers also encountered active resistance in the countryside. The peasantry hid the property of the kolkhozes, sovkhoses and MTS [machine-tractor station], they drove the livestock into the forests and steppes, they refused to deliver food to the occupiers, they reduced the planted area, sowing only for their own needs, they hid grain from the enemy, set afire barns and grain storage on the Nazi agricultural estates, they did not show up for field, road construction and repair work organized by the occupiers and sabotaged various instructions of the Nazi authorities.

The Soviet people courageously resisted the drive for Nazi forced labor. The Nazis endeavored to ship to Germany all the most able-bodied Soviet citizens. By this they pursued the goal not only of providing a cheap labor force for their economy but also exterminating the healthiest part of the population in the occupied areas in order to achieve the biological weakening of the Soviet people.

The underground members working by assignment of the underground party organizations in the Nazi councils, at labor exchanges, passport desks, housing administrations, migrant camps and the police promptly warned the partisans and the Soviet people of a forthcoming departure for Germany and supplied the latter with false documents. The partisans, receiving information about the next departure for Germany, rescued the trains with Soviet citizens and destroyed the Nazi teams which were driving the population to the assembly points.

During the period of the enemy's retreat, the Soviet patriots fought actively to salvage the people's property against plundering and destruction. Upon instructions of the party bodies, special groups were established in the population points to combat the enemy torchers and the detachments plundering public property as well as for intercepting transports leaving for Germany carrying public property and trains with Soviet citizens.

In being guided by Lenin's instructions on partisan warfare, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party initiated a struggle of all the people against the Nazi invaders on all the temporarily occupied territory of the nation. Over a million partisans and a multi-thousand army of underground members fought in the enemy rear. They were actively supported by tens of millions of Soviet people. Rising to the fight against the occupiers were workers, peasants and intelligentsia, persons of the most diverse ages and professions and representatives of all the Soviet nationalities.

The organizational and mass political work of the Communist Party ensured not only the great scope but also the high effectiveness of the partisan struggle. The Soviet partisans and underground during the war destroyed, wounded and captured around 1 million Nazi soldiers and officers, bureaucrats and personnel of the occupation administration and their supporters, they attacked more than 18,000 enemy trains, they knocked out over 4,000 Nazi tanks and armored vehicles, they destroyed and damaged 1,600 railroad bridges and caused much other harm to the enemy.¹⁴ An important result of the combat activities by the Soviet patriots in the enemy rear was the diverting of significant enemy forces to themselves, with up to 10 percent of all the ground forces fighting on the Soviet-German Front.¹⁵ The Soviet partisans in the full sense of the word in the enemy rear established a combat front which had an enormous impact on the morale of enemy troops and paralyzed the activities of the Nazi administration.

In terms of its scale, political and military results, the heroic struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy rear was an important military-political and operational-strategic factor in the victory of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War. It not only provided direct support for the Soviet Army in expelling the enemy from the homeland but was also a strong arousing example for the peoples of other countries under the heel of the Nazi occupiers.

The heroic, unstinting activities of the partisans and underground members gained nationwide recognition and high praise from the Communist Party and Soviet government. More than 127,000 partisans received the medal "For the Partisan of the Patriotic War" first and second degrees. Over 184,000 partisans and underground members received orders and medals of the Soviet Union, 249 partisans, underground members and participants in the Resistance Movement received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 2 of them--the famous commanders of partisan formations S. A. Kovpak and A. F. Fedorov--received this title twice.

The heroic struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy rear was one of the most vivid manifestations of the unbending will of the Soviet people for victory, their ardent patriotism and unbounded fidelity to the socialist system and the ideals of the Communist Party

FOOTNOTES

¹ See: V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 12, p 229.

² "Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], Moscow, Politizdat, Vol 5, book 1, 1970, p 260.

- ³ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 9, 1978, p 222.
- ⁴ "Istoriya KPSS," Vol 5, book 1, p 490.
- ⁵ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 7, 1976, p 309.
- ⁶ Ibid., p 307.
- ⁷ "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 6, 1965, p 262.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 5, 1975, p 293.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., Vol 8, 1977, pp 168-169.
- ¹¹ PA IIP pri TsK KP Ukrainy [Party Archives of the Party History Institute Under the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party], folio 62, inv. 1, file 1, sheet 136, Appendix 7.
- ¹² Leningradskiy oblpartarkhiv [Leningrad Oblast Party Archives], folio 0-116, inv. 1, stor. unit 225, sheet 24.
- ¹³ PA IIP pri TsK KP Belorussii [Party Archives of the Party History Institute Under the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party], folio 3500, inv. 3, file 77, sheet 93; file 119, sheet 210.
- ¹⁴ "Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], Moscow, 3d Edition, Vol 19, 1975, p 234.
- ¹⁵ "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy...", Vol 6, p 281.

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ARMY GEN GRIBKOV WRITES ON WARSAW PACT RESPONSIBILITIES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 26 Apr 85) pp 82-91

[Article by Army Gen A. I. Gribkov, chief of staff and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states: "Thirty Years of Guarding Peace and Socialism"]

[Text] Combining their efforts, the peoples of the countries of the socialist community are persistently fighting for the implementation of the constructive plans developed by the congresses of their communist and worker parties. They oppose the aggressive, militarist policy of imperialism with a firm resolution to do everything to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and to preserve peace as the necessary condition for solving the tasks of socialist construction. A new and outstanding contribution to the achievement of these noble goals will be made by the approaching regular 27th CPSU Congress.

The congress is preceded by a number of important events. On 9 May the peoples of the Soviet Union and the countries of socialism celebrate the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War against fascist Germany and its allies. This world historical event is also being widely celebrated by all progressive people on earth.

A great event of this year is the 30th anniversary of the military-political defense alliance of the countries of socialism, the Warsaw Pact Organization.¹

The conclusion of the Warsaw Pact was the socialist states' response to the threat to their security from the military-political bloc of the capitalist countries of Europe, that is, the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), which was founded in 1949 and immediately became an instrument of the policy of aggression.

Having unleashed the "cold war" and acting from a "position of strength," the imperialist NATO states strove to hinder the strengthening of the world system of socialism, to brake the development of the revolutionary process in the world, and to halt the disintegration of the colonial system. They counted on forcing the socialist countries to make principled compromises and on achieving the liquidation of socialist achievements. To be specific, the plans to prepare for and wage a war against the USSR and the other socialist countries, which

were developed by the Pentagon at the end of the forties and in the fifties, were aimed at this. Nuclear weapons were what was mainly counted on in these plans.

Striving to prevent a worsening of the situation, the conference of socialist countries which was held in Moscow in November and December 1954 proposed the establishment in Europe of a system of collective security, based on participation in it by all European states. However, the Western powers did not take up this proposal and continued their policy of increasing international tension.

In these conditions, the socialist countries, proceeding from the objective necessity of opposing the combined forces of imperialism with their collective strength, and guided by the Leninist ideas of the international defense of the achievements of socialism, were forced to set about forming a military-political defense alliance and to sign the Warsaw Pact.

From the first years of its existence the Warsaw Pact has been subjected to constant attacks by bourgeois ideologists striving to distort its genuine goals and nature and to ascribe intentions to it which are in no way compatible with the spirit and the letter of the Pact. The intentions of our ideological adversaries are clear: they would like to undermine the unity and cohesion of the Warsaw Pact member states and to destroy the combat community of the fraternal countries and their armies in order to weaken the combined might of the socialist defense-political alliance. The groundlessness and fruitfulness of these attempts are obvious.

As a completely new type of alliance of states, the Warsaw Pact is of an exclusively defensive nature. Its participants do not have any territorial claims or aggressive intentions toward other countries. Herein lies its fundamental difference from NATO and other imperialist blocs.

The mutual relations between the Warsaw Pact member states are based on the principles of their total equality, of noninterference in other states' internal affairs, of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, and of the harmonious combination of national and international interests. Meanwhile the principle of equality is not even mentioned in either the North Atlantic Pact or the other blocs of the capitalist countries, and neither do they have any obligations to observe such an important principle of international law as non-interference by some states in the internal affairs of others.

The Warsaw Pact faithfully serves peace and socialism. Its participants have never spared their efforts to prevent nuclear war, providing each other and other socialist states with comprehensive assistance, and have conducted and are conducting consistently and persistently the struggle for detente and disarmament, for the security of peoples, and for ensuring peace on earth.

A particular role in this belongs to the Political Consultative Committee--the highest organ of the Warsaw Pact Organization--in the work of which the general (first) secretaries of communist and workers parties and the heads of government of the allied states participate. Many initiatives which the Political Consultative Committee has advanced have become the basis of large international forums or have been reflected in a number of important bilateral interstate acts.

As a result of the consistent and untiring struggle of Warsaw Pact participants, which was begun in the mid-fifties, it was possible to improve relations between the socialist countries and NATO, thanks to which the conclusion of the Quadripartite agreement on West Berlin became possible in 1971. It was a major milestone on the road of improving the political climate in Europe, and contributed to the signing of the Basic Agreement on the foundations of relations between two sovereign states, the GDR and the FRG, in December 1972. Questions of regularizing relations between the two German states were constantly on the agenda of the conferences of the Political Consultative Committee from the start of its activity up until the seventies, and were reflected in the decisions of European and international conferences of communist parties. Progress in the mutual relations between the GDR and the FRG was furthered to a considerable extent by the conclusion in 1970 of treaties between the USSR and the FRG, and also between the Polish People's Republic and the FRG, which confirmed the immovability of postwar borders in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact member states consistently and persistently supported the demands of the people of Czechoslovakia for an admission of the invalidity of the shameful 1938 Munich Agreement by the FRG. The importance and necessity of such an agreement was pointed out at the conferences of the Political Consultative Committee in 1971 and 1972, and also during the summit meeting of the leadership of the USSR and FRG in May 1973. As a result of the efforts which were made, a treaty between the CSSR and the FRG annulling the Munich Agreement was signed in December of the same year. Soon the other socialist states also normalized their relations with the FRG.

A major achievement of peace-loving forces was the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was held on the initiative of the Warsaw Pact participants, and which culminated in the signing of the Final Act, a long-term program of cooperation between states, on 1 August 1975. This multilaterally consolidated the political-territorial results of World War II and recognized the principle of the inviolability of borders. An important step toward the conference was the Declaration on Peace, Security, and Cooperation adopted by the Political Consultative Committee in 1972 in Prague.

In all the subsequent years the Warsaw Pact member states have continued to exert efforts aimed at deepening and widening the relaxation of international tension, they have striven to make this process irreversible, and have actively implemented the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation with capitalist states, combining this with a resolute rebuff of the aggressive schemes of imperialism. It was precisely at this that the decisions of the Bucharest (1976) and Moscow (1978) conferences of the Political Consultative Committee were aimed.

At the anniversary conference of the Political Consultative Committee in May 1980 in Warsaw to mark the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, its participants confirmed their resolution to continue the struggle for the strengthening of security and the development of cooperation in Europe, for international detente, for the halting of the arms race, and for disarmament.

In 1981, a considerable proportion of the proposals submitted for discussion at the UN General Assembly by the Soviet Union together with its allies were aimed

at the preservation and strengthening of peace and were approved by an overwhelming majority of UN member states. In the same year the USSR declared its readiness to an agreement on a total renunciation by both sides, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, of the use of all types of medium-range weapons in Europe, and also proposed that in the end this region should be made free of all types of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, when the U.S. President called for the organization of a "crusade" against socialism in a speech to the British Parliament (June 1982), at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, the USSR announced, with the approval of its Warsaw Pact allies, that it would unilaterally assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. As is known, the nuclear powers of NATO avoided assuming such an obligation.

A complex of concrete measures to maintain detente, consolidate peace, and halt the arms race were set out in the Political Declaration adopted by the Prague conference of the Political Consultative Committee (January 1983). It also contained a treaty on mutual non-use of military force and maintaining relations of peace. However, the countries of the West did not respond to these proposals.

Consistently advocating peace and disarmament, our country advanced, in the name of the socialist states, new and important initiatives aimed at decreasing the level of military confrontation in central Europe at the Vienna negotiations in 1983. Agreement should have been reached on the reduction of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in central Europe to an equal collective level of 900,000 men on each side. This proposal did not receive the support of the Western powers either.

Striving to continue and develop the orientation of the all-European process defined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Warsaw Pact member states submitted for discussion at the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament in Europe, which opened in January 1984 in Stockholm, a proposal for the renunciation of the use of force and first use of nuclear weapons, for the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons, for the reduction of military expenditure, for notification of the conduct of military maneuvers, and for limitation of their scale. Unfortunately, this peace-loving step by the countries of the socialist community did not produce any positive results either.

In March 1984, the Warsaw Pact member states proposed to the NATO countries that preliminary consultations should be conducted with the participation of all countries belonging to both alliances, with the aim of reaching agreement on the start of negotiations on a mutual non-increase of military expenditure and on a subsequent reduction of it. And in May, the fraternal countries made a proposal to the NATO bloc participants that a treaty should be concluded on mutual non-use of military force and maintaining peaceful relations. Again, there was no response.

The socialist countries advanced a clear program to improve the international climate and to struggle for detente and disarmament at the summit economic conference of CEMA members held in Moscow in June 1984.

"The leaders of the communist and workers parties and the heads of state and government of the CEMA member countries," the declaration adopted by the conference states, "consider that it is necessary to conduct matters not toward a confrontation between states with different social systems, not toward raising evermore new barriers in relations between them, but toward a search for constructive ways of developing peaceful and stable international political and economic relations, taking into account the realities existing in the world and the interests of all countries. They are firmly convinced that no world problems, including the historical disagreement between socialism and capitalism, can be solved by means of war."²

The lessons of the Great Patriotic War are of intransient importance in the struggle of the Warsaw Pact member states for peace. This is especially important now, when reactionary imperialist circles, primarily of the United States, are conducting a policy of attaining a dominating position in the world and are striving to upset the military-strategic balance between East and West that has arisen, and to gain military superiority in their favor.

Guided by the strategy of "direct opposition" adopted in the United States for the eighties, which envisages the decisive use of military might as the main means to achieving superiority over the USSR and world supremacy, Washington has developed an unparalleled arms race, drawing its NATO allies into it more and more. An extensive "rearmament program" aimed at preparing armed forces and countries as a whole for waging war on any scale both with and without the use of nuclear weapons has been adopted and is being implemented at a swift rate. First and foremost, programs for the production and deployment of new strategic land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear weapons are being implemented at accelerated rates, as a result of which their capabilities of delivering nuclear warheads in one launch will grow by 1.5 times in the eighties. The offensive potential of nuclear weapons will increase even more because of the projected fitting of new long-range cruise missiles on U.S. Navy ships and submarines.

Steps to militarize outer space are being taken more and more actively. In March 1983, President Reagan announced a wide-scale program to "conquer outer space." At the present time the American administration has advanced a plan for a so-called wide-scale anti-missile defense, which is in reality an aggressive plan because, as T. Keras, one of the American specialists in the sphere of nuclear weapons, attests, "for the United States the creation of an anti-satellite system would make no sense unless it was planned to carry out a first strike and start a nuclear war."³

The United States is accelerating the rates of production, renewal, and accumulation of chemical weapons. It is planned that up to 10 billion dollars will be spent in implementing the "chemical rearmament" program for the years 1983 to 1987.

The policy of achieving military superiority is reflected in the constant growth (up to 12 to 14 percent per annum) of allocations to militarist preparations. In 1985, the U.S. military budget will amount to a colossal sum, almost 300 billion dollars. The siting of almost 600 new American medium-range missiles in some NATO countries, which began in December 1983, opened up a new and particularly dangerous phase in the arms race. They create an additional strategic

threat for the USSR and its allies and considerably increase the danger of a sudden strike and the outbreak of a nuclear war.

In order to increase the already enormous strength of the NATO bloc's groupings of troops, which are of a clearly expressed offensive nature, it is envisaged that they should be reinforced by transferring troops and weapons from the United States to Europe, the modernization of conventional weapons and general purpose forces is being carried out on an unprecedented scale, and their combat capabilities are being increased primarily through the introduction of new systems of high-precision weapons. A shift of U.S. troops to a new organization and establishment is being carried out and "Divisions 86" [as published] with a higher combat potential are being formed. The organizational structure of the troops of the United States' allies is also being perfected.

At the same time, year in and year out the United States and NATO increase the scale of their military exercises, the regions for conducting which are drawing nearer to the borders of the Warsaw Pact countries, while the exercises themselves, such as, for example, Reforger, Wintex, and, since 1975, NATO Joint Armed Forces Autumn Forge maneuvers, are a kind of rehearsal of unleashing and waging a war against the USSR and its allies.

In addition to material preparation for a war, unremitting, concentrated "psychological attacks" are launched against the socialist social system and Marxist-Leninist ideology, and plans for "destroying socialism as a social system" are proclaimed. Imperialism rains down whole streams of lies and slander on the socialist countries.

Convincing testimony of the aggressive policies of the NATO bloc was provided by the results of the sessions of its leading organs which were held in Brussels in December 1984. The decisions adopted concern stepping up the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe in 1985, these missiles being aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies, and further strengthening the armed forces of the NATO European countries by means of introducing a considerable quantity of the most up-to-date weapons this year: tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, artillery weapons, antitank weapons, aircraft, and military vessels. It is also envisaged to build military installations on a large scale on the territory of Europe on which 7.85 billion dollars will be expended. Other military preparations will also be carried out.

Working to improve the political climate in the world, the CPSU and other fraternal parties proceed from the fact that the present course aimed at gaining military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, which is being pursued by the most reactionary circles of American imperialism and by a number of the United States' NATO allies--a course dangerous to the security of the peoples--is historically doomed to failure.

While waging a struggle for peace and disarmament, the countries of the socialist community show tireless concern for their own security, one of the main conditions of which is that of preserving the military-strategic balance between them and the NATO bloc. It has been stated on more than one occasion with great determination by the leaders of the Marxist-Leninist parties and the governments of the Warsaw Pact member states that, proceeding from the interests

of peace and safeguarding their own security, the allied countries will never permit military superiority to be gained over them. The essence of their military policy remains unchanged--everything for reliable defense and nothing above this. As far as the Soviet people are concerned, everything they do in the military sphere pursues one aim only--to safeguard their security and that of their friends and allies, fetter the forces of war, and prevent a war being unleashed by imperialists.

Of paramount importance in the cause of defending peace and socialism is the multilateral military cooperation between fraternal socialist countries and their armies, which has its origins in the World War II years and which has been developed during the postwar period. The security of our countries, the peaceful labor of our peoples, and the prevention of a nuclear war depend to a great extent on the unity and cohesion of these countries.

Military cooperation has been based all these years on the decisions of the allied states adopted at meetings of the Political Consultative Committee. A great deal of work to put these decisions into practice is done by the military organs of the Warsaw Pact Organization: the Committee of Ministers of Defense, the Joint Supreme Command, the Military Council, the General Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, and also national military organs.

All joint work performed by the military organs of the Warsaw Pact Organization is based on a common Marxist-Leninist approach to the evaluation of the military-political situation and on a unity of views regarding the defense of socialist achievement and military organizational development. The coordinated decisions and recommendations which are made by the Committee of Ministers of Defense and the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces are put into practice by all the allied armies, because they are collectively worked out and take into account the interests of each country's armed forces.

The work of the General Staff of the Joint Armed forces, which most actively participates in implementing the decisions and recommendations made by the Committee of Ministers of Defense and the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces, is carried out in close contact with the general (chiefs of) staff of the allied armies and in a spirit of total mutual understanding. The General Staff devotes a great deal of attention to planning military construction matters and the problems of operational and combat training, as well as to organizing and implementing joint measures.

Coordinating the efforts of the allied countries in the matters of defense and the construction and development of the national armies and of the Joint Armed Forces as a whole is still of paramount importance in military cooperation. The chief aim of this aspect of cooperation is to increase the combat might and combat readiness of the troops and fleets and to perfect their organizational structure, technical equipping, and training. This is all the more important in view of the fact that the threat of war from the NATO bloc is increasing.

Comprised of fixed contingents of forces made available by every allied country, the Joint Armed Forces now include formations and units of ground forces, air defense forces, air forces, and naval forces. The Soviet Union's forces incorporated in the Joint Armed Forces are the basis of their combat might. Thanks

to the constant attention and concern of the communist and workers parties of the Warsaw Pact countries, the Joint Armed Forces have traveled a long path of comprehensive and qualitative development and have grown considerably stronger since they came into being. The organizational structure of the arms of the armed forces and the branches of service has been perfected, their technical equipping has been considerably improved, and the standard of operational and combat training of staff and forces has risen.

The pride of the Joint Armed Forces is the personnel--well-trained in a professional respect and deeply loyal to the ideas of socialism and to military duty. Between 85 and 97 percent of all officers are members and candidate members of communist and workers parties, and between 60 and 70 percent of all soldiers and sergeants are members of communist youth organizations. The party organizations are the cementing force of the military collectives.

The readiness of the Joint Armed Forces to repel possible aggression and their ability to fulfill tasks in an extreme situation are increasing in connection with the continuing militarist course of the NATO bloc. Measures are being adopted to equip the allied forces with the most up-to-date combat equipment and weapons, and their organization is being perfected. Particular attention is being devoted to training staff to ensure the directing of troops in a situation which could arise in the event of aggression.

The development and strengthening of all-round cooperation is facilitated by friendly visits by military delegations and vessels from allied countries, as well as by meetings between the leaders of fraternal armies.

Close military-technical cooperation has acquired a multifaceted, purposeful nature. The fraternal countries are committed to this cooperation because of the sharply intensified efforts by the United States and NATO to gain superiority in the military-technical sphere. Cooperation consists in our countries working out a unified, coordinated military-technical policy and jointly developing potentials to produce defense products guaranteeing the allied armies' requirements in the sphere of contemporary arms.

The problems of training the allied forces for joint actions against the aggressor occupy a special place in military cooperation. This work is carried out both according to the plan of the Joint Supreme Command and by national commands. Great attention is devoted to determining the main tasks of combat and political training, mastering new combat equipment in short periods of time and developing ways and methods of using this equipment in battle, coordinating forces and weapons involved in joint measures and the time spent in implementing them, and analyzing the results of operational and combat training.

Various forms and methods of cooperation are extensively utilized for putting plans into practice: joint command-staff exercises and military games, tactical and specialized tactical exercises, training and methodology conferences and meetings of the leading staff of the allied armies, joint training of subunits of different nationalities at training centers, the drawing up and application of common documents on operational and combat training, the exchange of scientific and instructional military literature, and so forth.

A central place is occupied by joint exercises, which make it possible to most fully work out the problems of conducting combat operations with groups of coalition forces. It is at these exercises that commanders and staff perfect their practical skills in organizing interaction between forces of different nationalities and in firmly and constantly directing them in the course of combat operations. The exercises also help to enhance the field, air and sea skills of the personnel, and primarily their ability to efficiently utilize weapons and equipment in contemporary battle.

Of particularly great importance are the full-scale exercises conducted under the leadership of ministers of defense, the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces, deputy ministers of defense, and other leading persons. Measures of this kind primarily concern the "Alliance" command-staff exercises and the exercises of staff and forces which go under the code names of "Brotherhood-in-Arms," "Shield," and so forth.

Thus, the "Alliance-84" exercise carried out in 1984 made it possible to work out the problems of directing forces and coordinating the staff of the allied armies and navies while repelling the aggression of the enemy. In the same year the problems of coordinating the staff and forces of the allied armies in the course of joint combat operations were studied in practice at the "Shield-84" exercise.

Joint exercises of arms of the armed forces have well recommended themselves, as it is during these exercises that air defense forces, air forces, and naval forces master the methods of using combat equipment and weapons actually in combat, while leading staff and officers perfect their skills in directing the combat operations of the formations, units, and vessels under them.

Tactical and special-tactical exercises of arms of service are distinguished by their high level of instructiveness. These are, for example, such exercises as "Summer-84" and others, which were conducted with the participation of allied formations and units in 1984.

Joint exercises are also of great political importance and are a genuine school for the combat community and the patriotic and international education of the soldiers and populations of the countries of the socialist community.

Strengthening the defense capabilities of the Warsaw Pact member states, developing their Joint Armed Forces, and raising the scientific level of the tasks solved by them promotes coordination of the fraternal countries' efforts in the sphere of military science. The practical importance of military science has increased now, in particular, when the uninterrupted and rapid development of weapons of armed struggle based on the latest achievements of science and technology, and also that of the methods of their military use, is taking place.

The fact that military-scientific work in the Joint Armed Forces is now conducted on the basis of a mutually agreed long-term plan, envisaging the joint elaboration of problems of the theory and practice of military affairs, represents an important achievement. The most important of these problems are discussed at the military-scientific conferences of the Joint Armed Forces and the national armies. The military press is widely used for exchanging the experience of the

build-up and training of armed forces. Articles by generals and officers of the allied armies are regularly published in Soviet periodicals. Material by Soviet authors is correspondingly published in the military journals of the fraternal countries. Moreover, a regular exchange of military publications of the fraternal countries has been established.

The importance of cooperation in training military cadres is not diminishing. As is known, in the years of World War II, the Soviet land provided assistance to the rising liberation armies of a number of European states not only with weapons, but also by training officers of various arms of service. In the post-war period this area of military cooperation continued to develop and became multifaceted. Essentially with the assistance of the Soviet Union, military training institutions were established in all the socialist countries. At the same time, the training of cadres for the national armies continued in Soviet military academies and schools, and is still conducted at the present time. There is a constant exchange of experience of training and educational work, training manuals, lectures, and methodological developments.

The cooperation of political organs, which is conducted on the basis of the decisions of the communist and workers parties, occupies a major place in the life and activity of the allied armies. It takes various forms: the exchange of delegations of representatives of political organs, conferences of these representatives, liaison on questions of party-political work, the exchange of military lecturers, of army and navy ensembles, and of the musical and song repertoire, and much else. This makes it possible to make wide use of the experience of organizational and ideological work, taking into account the national features and traditions of each fraternal army, and also to conduct the education of personnel in a spirit of a high degree of responsibility for the fulfillment of the soldier's duty, of patriotism, and of socialist internationalism.

Military cooperation is successfully developing in other areas, too. Close and friendly ties have been established between groups of Soviet troops temporarily based on the territory of a number of other socialist countries, in accordance with concluded agreements, and the armies and populations of these countries. The fraternal armies' athletic links, in which the activity of the Sports Committee of the Friendly Armies plays the main role, are constantly being strengthened.

It is possible to assert with full justification that at the contemporary stage, the military cooperation conducted within the framework of the Warsaw Pact has in essence acquired the nature of a genuine combat community of fraternal armies. The most important condition for its steady development and for the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact member states' defense capabilities is wise leadership by the communist and workers parties. As experience shows, only Marxist-Leninist parties are capable of ensuring the scientific leadership of the military build-up and of the strengthening of the collective defense of the socialist achievements of peoples.

The dangerous development of the international situation, which is occurring through the fault of the imperialist circles in the United States and a number of other NATO bloc countries, gives rise to the necessity of further perfecting military cooperation, strengthening the Warsaw Pact Organization and its Joint

Armed Forces, and increasing their readiness to reliably ensure the defense of the socialist community from the encroachment of any aggressor. The strength of the Warsaw Pact lies in the unity and cohesion of its participants. For precisely this reason, the mutual development of friendly ties is the constant concern of the fraternal countries. "The first commandment of party and state," Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stresses, "is to protect and strengthen in every possible way our fraternal friendship with our nearest comrades-in-arms and allies, the countries of the great socialist community."⁴

FOOTNOTES

¹ The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in the Polish capital on 14 May 1985, entered history under this name. Its participants at the present time are the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the USSR, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

² PRAVDA, 16 June 1984.

³ SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 4 January 1985.

⁴ PRAVDA, 12 March 1985.

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